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Andrew Payne’s “Dianoia, Dialectic, and Giving an Account of Hypotheses in Republic 6 and 7 
Comments by Sophia Stone 
 In the beginning of his paper, Andrew points out that “the use of dianoia in mathematical 
sciences is a prerequisite for the use of dialectic, but mastery of dialectic goes beyond what 
dianoia can accomplish,” (Payne, P. 1). He quotes a passage from the Republic where the ‘song 
of dialectic’ is ‘imitated by the power of sight. Right away we begin with an analogy using 
incommensurables: measuring something audible with our eyes. This is supposed to help us 
understand how dialectic works, without the means of the senses, to “find the being itself of each 
thing” and not giving up “until he grasps the good itself with understanding itself.” If dialectic is 
supposed to trump dianoia, then why, at the end of the paper, Archytas has a working account of 
consonances from experiencing sound, and Socrates doesn’t have an account? This is not so 
much a flaw in Andrew’s paper as it is a sign that knowing how to use dialectic so that we 
achieve our intended aim isn’t as easy as it sounds.   
 First I’ll briefly summarize what I take Andrew’s account of giving an account using 
dialectic is, and then I’ll state some worries, not with his account but with the examples he uses. 
Specifically, I mean the observations he makes about Plato’s Euthphro for why the account of 
holiness fails and his discussion of the odd and even. These are minor worries. What interests me 
in Andrew’s paper is that even though Socrates prefers the dialectic over using dianoia for 
establishing an account, Socrates himself is unable to do that for piety in the Euthyphro and for 
consonant numbers in the Republic. If Socrates is unable to give a satisfactory account for these, 
then how would he be able to do it for the Just and the Beautiful and the Good?   
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 Andrew explains that “Dialecticians know things in terms of their being or essence, 
including even the Form of the Good, and this knowledge rests in part on the ability to give an 
account of what one knows,” (Payne, P. 2).  He points out that dialectic can, and dianoia cannot, 
give an account of the things each cognitive power studies. Dialectic “operates in part by giving 
an account of these hypotheses,” (Ibid.). Andrew contrasts his interpretation with that of another 
he calls the Inferential Grounding interpretation, which we could call I.G. for short. I.G. is where 
one takes unproved assumptions and derives from them more basic principles, and analyzing 
them until they no longer need to be analyzed. Andrew says that the obvious candidate for such a 
principle would be the “non-hypothetical principle, the Form of the Good.” (Ibid) Hugh Benson 
develops a ‘sophisticated’ I.G. where the dialectician is distinguished from the mathematician, 
where the dialectician completes the process of analyzing the hypotheses, the mathematician 
takes “as known, as an archē as not needing confirmation, what is fact unknown…still in need of 
confirmation,” (Payne on Benson).  
Andrew points out that “to give an account” has a wide range of activities, and cautions 
us that we should be wary of “any one-size-fits-all specification of giving an account,” (p. 4). 
Yet, generally, we can see that the first step of giving an account is to note that the hypotheses 
include definitions, and that part of giving an account is to give an account of the definitions. 
Andrew explains that:  
The full achievement of dialectic is to give an account of the being of each thing, 
including the Form of the Good, and to defend that account in elenctic discussion, in the 
way that Socrates expects his interlocutors to defend their answers to a what-is-F 
question (534b8-c5). So to give an account of hypotheses is something that involves the 
ability to explicate and defend a definition. (Payne, p. 5)  
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This is where Andrew’s account differs from the I.G. account and where he gives his strongest 
criticism of the contrasting account. It is not merely about finding more basic principles, or on 
the more sophisticated account, finding higher principles, from which to derive the truth of a 
hypothesis from. For Andrew, “what is crucial is showing whether and how the definition 
expresses the essence of the definiendum,” (Payne, p. 6). To illustrate his point, he turns to the 
Platonic dialogue Euthyphro. He first argues against Benson’s I.G. account, showing how it isn’t 
sufficient to tell us why the definition of piety fails, and then he observes how an examination of 
the definition of even triangles fails to give an account of what even is.  
Andrew says that Benson’s I.G. account doesn’t tell us why the hypothesis “piety is what 
all the gods love” is rejected. If Socrates had used Benson’s account, it would be rejected 
because it couldn’t be demonstrated to have derived from other more basic principles. (Payne, p. 
6) Payne says that it is rejected because it conflicts with other beliefs held by Socrates and 
Euthyphro. Andrew is right that even if the hypothesis in question cohered well with our beliefs 
and even if its truth could be grounded in other, more basic principles, it would not suffice to 
show that it is a good definition. But I disagree with Andrew for why the hypothesis was rejected 
in the first place. It was rejected because the hypothesis only gives an affect or quality of piety 
(11b), it is an incomplete account and akin to the account rejected at 8e that the same things are 
loved and hated by the gods. And this rejection is the result of the dialectic.  
So what we have here is an opportunity to show how the dialectic works. When we can 
reject accounts that are incomplete, we are closer to achieving the account that we seek. In 
dialectic, we have proof for a positive hypothesis by showing that its negative ends in a 
contradiction. (Parmenides c-d) The example from the Euthyphro illustrates that the process isn’t 
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finished. We know what definitions do not work for piety and we have yet to come across one 
that does. This is why Socrates, at the end of the dialogue, presses on. He knows that their work 
isn’t finished. 
[Examine Greek Euthyphro 12d8-10] 
εἰ µὲν οὖν σύ µε ἠρώτας τι τῶν  
νυνδή, οἷον ποῖον µέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθµοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν @1  
τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθµός, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι ὃς ἂν µὴ σκαληνὸς 
ᾖ ἀλλ’ ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;    (10) 
Grube’s translation: 
Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of 
number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is (not 
skalēnos but isokelēs) divisible into two equal, not unequal parts. Or do you not think so?  
Andrew corrects the translation given by Grube: “the evens are the part of number which 
is isosceles and not scalene,” (12d8-10). But then Andrew finds problems with this definition,  
“if I were asked to give an account of the definition ‘Even numbers are those numbers which are 
isosceles and not scalene,’ I would be hard-pressed to accomplish the task.” (Payne, p. 7)Yes! 
An account for that definition would require the kind of examination that Socrates gave to 
Euthyphro.  Let’s look at the proposed set of prior hypotheses from Andrew: 
 
1. What isosceles numbers are 
2. What isosceles triangles are 
3. Triangles are a plane figure with three connecting points whose interior angles together 
equal 180 degrees (basic hypothesis of triangles) 
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Andrew says we can’t get to a closer definition of even numbers from these. But this doesn’t 
show that the hypotheses are false or that they should be thrown away. This shows that, like the 
conversation between Euthyphro and Socrates, the process is incomplete.  
First, we need to start with the definition of number, arithmos. An arithmos is a limited 
multitude. Once we agree that this is our starting point, we then can query the kinds of things that 
are numbers. To the Greeks, there were pebble arithmoi from the Pythagoreans, and when these 
points were in a line, these arithmoi were called ‘line numbers’. When these points were further 
arranged in a plane, where the points were connecting, these arithmoi were called plane 
numbers, and when more points were added on additional planes, these arithmoi were the solid 
numbers. But we can see the commonality to all of these numbers, that they are multitudes. This 
confirms the original definition.  
The next thing is to query how the multitudes can be divided, and further queries about 
how the parts relate to the whole and how the parts relate to the other parts. Part of these 
inquiries, especially the one we are interested in with respect to plane numbers, is 
commensurability and incommensurability. Which definitions can carry over to different 
arithmoi and which cannot? Naturally equality and inequality will be important considerations.  
Let’s first start off with the two triangles, one is an isosceles, the other is scalene. What 
are their properties? What is the smallest monas or unit by which we can measure their 
multitude? We can’t consider the point, for there both triangles have the same amount of definite 
points, ‘three’, but an indefinite amount of points contained in the lines. They both have the same 
amount of lines and the same amount of angles. This establishes the fact that they are both 
triangles. So the next query is to look at the length of the lines and compare them. We will see 
that the isosceles triangle has two equal lines and two equal angles, whereas the scalene triangle 
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has no equal lines and no equal angles. We’ve reached then an intermediate conclusion: the 
isosceles triangle can be divided into two equal angles and two equal lines whereas the scalene 
triangle cannot. However, we cannot stop the inquiry here because there is still an unequal line 
and an unequal angle not accounted for, and, since these are ‘left over’ if we were to end our 
inquiry here, we would have to conclude that the isosceles triangle is equal with respect to two 
parts of the whole, but unequal with respect to one part of the whole. We have reached a 
conclusion from an incomplete dialectical inquiry. If it ends in a contradiction, we know our 
work isn’t complete. We have yet to reach an account that tells us exactly why the arithmos of an 
isosceles triangle is said to be even.  That account of the even for the isosceles triangle must 
work for the account of the even in other kinds of numbers in order for it to get at the essence of 
what it means to be ‘even’. So the reason why an isosceles triangle is even can’t be because the 
triangle has two equal lines and two equal angles. It must be because the triangle can be divided 
into two equal parts. [note that this is how Grube translated the Greek ] If you start a division of 
the isosceles from the angle that is not equal to the others, and imagine a straight line drawn from 
that angle to the line that is not equal to the others, what will result is an exact division of the 
triangle into two equal parts. This is the essence of what the even is in every even number: that 
which can be divided into two equal parts. I don’t know if that would be a satisfying definition of 
even numbers, but it does offer an account of what even is and why an isosceles triangle would 
be called an even arithmos. 
 
At the end of his paper, Andrew observes that Archytas has a working account of 
consonant sounds in harmonics and that this account is unsatisfactory to Socrates because, “the 
range of consonances, items of musical interest, and beauty” cannot be determined by 
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experience. Yet interestingly Socrates himself fails to provide an account of consonance at the 
level of numbers. We wonder what such an account would look like? 
We actually have an example of the dialectic successfully applied to consonance in 
audible and inaudible sounds, from Zeno. We find this account from Simplicius’s commentary 
on Aristotle’s Physics: 
 ‘Tell me, Protagoras,” he said, “Does a grain of millet when it falls make a sound, 
or a ten-thousandth part of a grain” When he said they would not, (Zeno) said, “Does a 
bushel of millet make a sound when it falls, or not?” When he said it would make a 
sound, Zeno said, “Isn’t there a ratio between a bushel of millet and a signle grain, and 
even of a ten-thousandth part of a single grain?” When he said there was, Zeno said, 
“Well then, will the ratios of the sounds to one another not be the same? As the things 
making the sounds, so will be the sounds, and given that this is so, if the bushel of grain 
makes a sound, so the single grain and the ten-thousandth part of a grain will also make a 
sound.” (DK29A29; Simplicius in Arist. Phys. 1108.18 (on 250a19), cited in Pritchard 
1995: 143) 
 
We don’t have a definition of consonant sounds here, but we can extract here the principle that if 
there is a certain ratio that governs the whole, then there must be a ratio that applies to the part. 
For Archytas, on his view, Zeno’s account is false, because only audible sound can be counted. 
For Zeno, and presumably for Socrates in the Republic, what must be counted are those features 
that are stable and unchanging, like the equally divisible in equal multitudes, or ratios that are 
consonant with the wholes of arithmoi and their parts. 
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The problem we are left with is, if we are barred from experience to figure out what the 
Just, the Beautiful and the Good is, then from which hypothesis should we use to begin with in 
order to give their account?  
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